HABEAS CORPUS-HARMLESS-ERROR RULE-PROPER HARMLESSERROR STANDARD ON HABEAS REVIEW OF FIFTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS IS WHETHER THE ERROR HAD "SUBSTANTIAL OR INJURIous EFFECT" ON THE JURY'S DETERMINATION OF PETITIONER'S

GuiLT-Brecht v. Abrahamson, 114 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
A person in state custody who alleges that his or her conviction was obtained in violation of the law, and whose right to direct
appeal has either lapsed or been exhausted, may seek relief
from the federal courts in the form of habeas corpus.' Conceptually, habeas review of a conviction is a civil remedy, unconnected
to the criminal appellate process.' The present federal statute
governing habeas relief, set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (federal habeas statute),' was derived from the Habeas Corpus Act of
1 LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 16, at 74-75 (1981). "Habeas
corpus" is Latin for "[y]ou have the body." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed.
1990). Black's refers to habeas corpus as the name bestowed upon a variety ofjudicial
orders or "writs." Id. Habeas corpus is also referred to as "the Great Writ." Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963), overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546
(1991). Justice Brennan, writing for the United States Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia,
noted that the English common law regarded habeas corpus as "the most celebrated
writ in the English law." Id. at 399-400 (quotation omitted).
2 JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: POST-TRiAL RIGHTS

§ 86, at 205, 207 (1976). The sole purpose of habeas review is freeing those persons
who have been imprisoned unlawfully. YACKLE, supranote 1, § 16, at 75. The central
principle behind habeas corpus is that "in a civilized society, government must always
be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is
entitled to his immediate release." Fay, 372 U.S. at 402. Habeas relief is considered
an "extraordinary remedy [directed at] the extraordinary restraints of custodial situations." YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1518 (7th ed. 1990) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Approximately 9000 to 10,000 habeas petitions
are filed each year by state prisoners. WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 28.2, at 1187 (2d ed. 1992). Less than four percent of filed petitions are
successful, however, and fewer still actually result in the petitioner's freedom. Id.
State prisoners have sought habeas relief alleging their convictions to be invalid due
to a wide variety of constitutional violations. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157,
162 (1986) (alleging ineffective assistance of counsel); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,
547 (1979) (claiming discrimination during grand jury selection); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 75 (1977) (asserting that the defendant did not understand the
nature of his rights as set forth in the Miranda warning); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 470, 472-73 (1976) (disputing the presentation of evidence seized in violation of
the Constitution); Fay, 372 U.S. at 394 (challenging the presentation of a coerced
confession, obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause, into evidence at trial);
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87 (1923) (alleging that a mob-influenced trial deprived defendants of due process of law).
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1988). Section 2241 (a) provides that the federal courts
may grant habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a). Providing for collateral review
of state prisoners' convictions, § 2254(a) states:
The Supreme Court, ajustice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court
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1867. Since the enactment of this Act, interpretations of the federal habeas statute have favored a gradually expanding scope of
habeas review, a philosophy that reached its pinnacle in 1963.5 By
the mid-1970s, however, the Supreme Court shifted away from decisions favoring prisoners' rights and began to slowly erode the expansive scope of habeas review.6
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.
Id. § 2254(a). Section 2254(b) adds to the requirement of custody that a petitioner
must have "exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State," or established
the "absence of [an] available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." Id.
§ 2254(b). Additionally, § 2255 provides collateral review for federal prisoners. Id.
§ 2255. Otherwise, the federal habeas statute is vague as to its scope and application.
LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 28.2(d), at 1183; see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S.
Ct. 1710, 1718 (1993) ("The [federal] statute says nothing about the standard for
harmless-error review in habeas cases."). For example, § 2243 states only that the
reviewing court shall "hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law
and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
4 SeeLAFAvE & ISRAEL, supranote 2, § 28.2(b), at 1181. The right to habeas review
is provided by negative grant in Article I of the Constitution, which states that "[t] he
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion if the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
2. Habeas corpus has existed as a means of relief for prisoners since the 14th century.
See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 28.1 (b), at 1178. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867
provided for the federal courts to grant habeas relief "in all cases where any person
may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty
or law of the United States . . . ." Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-86
(1867) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1989)). Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority in Fay, explained that the 1867 Act was Congress's response to the
upheavals of the Reconstruction. Fay, 372 U.S. at 415. Justice Brennan asserted that
Congress was confronted with the problem of protecting the constitutional rights of
freed slaves in the defeated South. Id. at 415-17. Thus, the 1867 Act not only broadened the scope of common law habeas protection, but, in Justice Brennan's view,
shifted primary responsibility for protecting state prisoner's constitutional rights from
the state courts to the federal courts. Id. at 416. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text (discussing Fay in more detail).
Most states allow for some form of post-conviction relief. See YACKLE, supra note
1, § 13, at 66-69. For example, in Wisconsin, the principal post-conviction remedy,
codified at Wisconsin Statute Annotated § 974.06, is modeled after § 2255 of the federal habeas statute. DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL AND STATE POSTCONVIcTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF 339 (2d ed. 1987). NewJersey provides for post-conviction relief in
Rule 3:22 of the NewJersey Rules Governing Criminal Practice. N.J. Ct. R. 3.22-1 to 12 (1993); see also State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459, 609 A.2d 1280, 1284 (1992)
(explaining the grounds for post-conviction relief in New Jersey state courts).
5 See Fay, 372 U.S. at 434-35 (ruling that a waiver of state appeals did not preclude
habeas review). See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing early interpretations of the federal habeas corpus statute).
6 See, e.g., Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 (concluding that habeas relief is not warranted
where petitioner had been allowed to fully present his or her claim in state proceed-
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Under the harmless-error doctrine, civil and criminal courts
reviewing the result of a trial may determine that an error in the
trial process was so harmless and insignificant to the parties' rights
that vacating the original result is unwarranted.7 The doctrine
arose in England during the 19th century as a response to a
proliferation of retrials resulting from insignificant errors in the
trial process.8 The United States adopted its own harmless-error
rule in 1919.' The current federal harmless-error statute, adopted
in 1949, substantially follows the 1919 Act and requires that appellate courts review the record "without regard to errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."1 0
ings); Sykes, 433 U.S. at 72 (requiring a habeas petitioner to show that failure to satisfy
a state procedural requirement was motivated by cause that resulted in prejudice); see
also Larry W. Yackle, ExplainingHabeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 993-94 & n.13
(1985) (noting that several Justices have expressed views favoring a more restricted
scope for habeas review with Justice Rehnquist leading the Court's charge).
7 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.6,
at 1160-75 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining the harmless-error doctrine, its history, and its
application to both constitutional and non-constitutional violations). The harmlesserror doctrine "serve [s] a very useful purpose insofar as [it] block[s] setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed
the result of a trial." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). Harmless error
provides for the conservation of "judicial resources by enabling appellate courts to
cleanse the judicial process of prejudicial error without becoming mired in harmless
error." ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 81 (1970). Harmless
error, and more specifically, harmless constitutional error, has not attracted a great
deal of scholarly attention. See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 81 & n.ll (1988) (pointing out that the leading
works on harmless constitutional error date back to the early 1970s) (citing TRAYNOR,
supra; Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal ConstitutionalError-A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 15 (1976); Philip J. Mause, Harmless
ConstitutionalError: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519
(1969); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm Of Harmless Error,59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973)).
8 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 27.6(a), at 1160. In 1873, the English Parliament included a version of the harmless-error rule in the Judicature Act of 1873. Id.
According to the English rule, retrials were not to be granted "on the basis of 'the
improper admission or rejection of evidence' or a 'misdirection' of the jury 'unless in
the opinion of the Court of Appeal some substantial wrong or miscarriage has thereby
been occasioned.'" Id.
9 Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, § 269, 40 Stat. 1181 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2111 (1988)). The 1919 statute deemed as harmless any "technical errors, defects,
or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Id. The purpose of the 1919 statute was to allow appellate review to correct significant errors in
the trial process, but not to afford persons "fairly convicted the multiplicity of loopholes which any highly rigid and minutely detailed scheme of errors, especially in
relation to procedure, will engender and reflect in a printed record." Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759-60 (1946). Simply put, the 1919 harmless-error rule
warned: "Do not be technical . . . ." Id. at 760 (citation omitted).
10 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988); see alsoAct of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, § 269, 40 Stat. 1181

(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988)) ("[T]he court shall give judgment after
an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical
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A court reviewing an error in the trial process that did not
implicate the Constitution would ask whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict." 1 In 1969, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that violations of the Constitution were also subject to harmlesserror analysis.1 2 The standard applied to constitutional errors required the prosecution to prove that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" to the interests of the defendant to
prevent reversal of the conviction.13 Prior to 1993, the "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was applied to constitutional
errors regardless of whether the error was raised on direct appeal
or habeas corpus review. 4
In a recent case, Brecht v. Abrahamson, 5 the United States
errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."). Section 2111 provides in full: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties." 28 U.S.C. § 2111. The harmless-error rule is contained in Rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED. R. CrM. P. 52(a).
Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provides for harmless error. FED.
R.Crv. P. 61.
11 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65; see also United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449
(1986) (invoking the Kotteakos test). See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing Kotteakos and Lane and the Court's application of the "substantial and injurious effect" standard). Lafave and Israel classified non-constitutional errors as
generally falling into one of two categories. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 27.6(a),
at 1161-62. Errors in the "structure of the proceeding" include "such matters as jury
selection, pleadings and venue." Id. § 27.6(a), at 1162. Analysis of such errors, Lafave
and Israel explained, generally requires determining the substantive purpose of the
right in question and whether the defendant was deprived of the benefit of that right.
Id. The second category of non-constitutional errors relates to the presentation of
evidence and is more amenable to analysis under the substantial prejudice standard
than structural errors. Id. Evidentiary non-constitutional errors include issues of admissibility of evidence, examination of witnesses, pre-trial discovery, jury instruction,
and the conduct of the judge and prosecutor at trial. Id.
12 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). See infra note 91 (providing an
analysis of the Court's reasoning in Chapman). Lafave and Israel stated: "Prior to the
1960s, it was generally assumed that constitutional violations could never be regarded
as harmless error." LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 27.6(c), at 1166. The authors
observed that in only one case prior to Chapman had the Court not concluded that a
constitutional error did not warrant reversal of a conviction. Id.
13 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
14 See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 28.2(d), at 1183 (stating that the federal
statute leaves open the proper scope of habeas review). In Brecht v. Abrahamson, the
Court noted that the applicability of the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to constitutional errors raised on habeas review was, at most, assumed. See
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 (1993). The federal habeas corpus statute, the Court asserted, is silent as to the issue of harmless error. Id.
15 113 S.Ct. 1710 (1993).
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Supreme Court held that the correct harmless-error standard applicable to habeas corpus petitions evaluated whether the constitutional error in question "had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict." 16 The Court rejected
the petitioner's argument that the correct standard applicable to
the collateral review of constitutional errors considered whether
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.17 Direct review
and collateral review, the Court explained, are separate and distinct avenues of post-conviction review."8
On October 17, 1985, a district attorney for Buffalo County,
Wisconsin, Roger Hartman, was shot at his home by his brother-inlaw, Todd Brecht. 19 Brecht fled the scene in his sister's automo16 Id. at 1722 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776). The Brecht Court resolved a
dispute between the United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits over the applicable harmless-error standard. Id. at 1716 & n.3. The Seventh
Circuit had previously held that the harmless-error standard applicable to the impermissible use of a defendant's post-arrest silence was the "substantial and injurious
effect" test of Kotteakos. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1375 (7th Cir. 1991),
affd, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (1993). In contrast, the Eighth Circuit applied the "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of Chapman to a similar situation. Bass v. Nix,
909 F.2d 297, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). See infra note 44 (discussing
Bass v. Nix).
17 Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1721 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). This standard, the
Court pronounced, is better suited to the nature and intent of collateral review, and
application of this less onerous standard promotes the notions underlying habeas jurisprudence. Id. at 1714.
18 Id. at 1719. Direct review of a conviction or judgment consists of the state appellate process and, upon a petition for certiorari, discretionary review by the United
States Supreme Court. L. Anita Richardson & Leonard B. Mandell, FairnessOver Fortuity: Retroactivity Revisited and Revised, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 11, 12 n.3 (citing Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965)). A "direct attack" of a conviction orjudgment
is defined as "an attempt, for sufficient cause, to have [a judgment or conviction]
annulled, reversed, vacated, corrected, declared void, or enjoined, in a proceeding
instituted for that specific purpose, such as an appeal.., or injunction to restrain its
execution." BLACK's LAw DIcrioNARY 459 (6th ed. 1990). Direct attacks contrast with
collateral attacks, which are attempts "to impeach the validity or binding force of [a
judgment or conviction] as a side issue or in a proceeding instituted for some other
purpose." Id. (citation omitted). In the context of habeas corpus, collateral review
defendants are "defendants who have litigated their claimed constitutional errors to
finality." Richardson & Mandell, supra, at 13-14 n.8.
19 State v. Brecht, 421 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Wis. 1988). Roger Hartman died almost one
month later from his injuries. Id. at 99. Brecht had been living with his sister and
brother-in-law in Wisconsin since October 12, 1985. Id. at 98. Prior to that period,
Brecht had been imprisoned in Georgia for a felony theft conviction. Id. The
Hartmans paid $3750 restitution for Brecht's theft and were able to transfer his probation status from Georgia to Wisconsin. Id. Brecht's probation status barred him
from leaving Wisconsin without permission and required that he refrain from violating the law. Id. Brecht's probation also required him to avoid intoxication and other
abusive habits. Id. Additionally, the Hartmans had voiced their opposition to
Brecht's drinking and homosexuality. Id.
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bile, which he soon disabled by driving it into a ditch.2 0 Brecht
refused assistance offered by a police officer and eventually obtained a ride to a town in Minnesota.2 1 Brecht did not discuss the
shooting at any time. 22 Thereafter, municipal police officers apprehended Brecht for the shooting of Hartman. 2' Brecht told one
of the arresting officers that a mistake had been made and that he
wished to speak with someone who would understand him.2 4
Although it was unclear exactly when Brecht received Miranda2 5
warnings after being arrested, Brecht was
informed of his Miranda
26
rights when he first appeared in court.
During presentation of the State's case against Brecht, the
prosecutor questioned witnesses regarding Brecht's silence about
the shooting before he had received his Mirandawarnings. 27 After
the State presented its case-in-chief, Brecht took the stand, claim20 Id. at 98-99. At trial, Brecht claimed that the shooting was an accident. Id. at 98.
Brecht testified that, on the day of the shooting, he was alone at the Hartman house,
drinking and shooting Hartman's gun in the backyard. Id. When Roger Hartman
pulled into the driveway, Brecht ran into the house, intending to replace the gun
without Hartman knowing that he had been using it. Id. Brecht testified that he
tripped and the gun went off, striking Hartman in the back. Id. Subsequently, Brecht
lost sight of the wounded Hartman. Id. Brecht testified that when he saw Hartman at
a neighbor's house, he fled the scene in his sister's automobile. Id. Hartman sought
the help of his neighbors, telling them that Brecht had shot him. Id.
21 Id. at 99.
22 Id.
23 Id. Brecht lied to the Minnesota police concerning his identity shortly after he
was apprehended. Id.
24 Id.
25 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda has been called "the centerpiece of the Warren Court's 'revolution in American criminal procedure .... '"
KAMisAR, supra note 2, at 473. Miranda requires that any statement made by a suspect
in police custody may not be used at his or her trial unless the state has informed the
suspect of his or her Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. Miranda warnings serve to protect an individual's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination in the compellingly coercive atmosphere
of police custody and interrogation. Id. at 467.
26 State v. Brecht, 405 N.W.2d 718, 722 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 421 N.W.2d 96
(Wis. 1988); Brecht, 421 N.W.2d at 99.
27 Brecht, 421 N.W.2d at 99. The Wisconsin Supreme Court asserted that Brecht's
constitutional right to silence was not implicated by his encounters with Officer
Zeller, who offered Brecht assistance after he had wrecked Mrs. Hartman's car, or
with Mr. Schlesselman, who drove Brecht to Minnesota. Id. at 99, 102. The court
concluded that Brecht was not in police custody in either encounter. Id. at 102. Accordingly, the court observed, it was permissible to question both witnesses as to
whether Brecht made any mention of the incident. Id. (citations omitted). The Wisconsin Supreme Court also concluded that Brecht's rights were not violated by the
State's questioning of Officer Papke, the arresting officer, regarding Brecht's failure
to explain his statement that a mistake had been made. Id. Because the issue had
been raised by Brecht's counsel, the court ruled that the State was free to question
Officer Papke regarding Brecht's post-arrest silence. Id. (citations omitted).
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ing for the first time that the shooting was an accident.28 The State
asked Brecht whether he had told anyone his version of the incident prior to the trial. 29 The State commented again on Brecht's
post-Miranda silence during its closing argument.3 0 Brecht was
later found guilty of first degree murder.3 '
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals overturned Brecht's conviction, concluding, inter alia, that the State's comments regarding
Brecht's failure to explain his actions, after he had been arrested
and read his Miranda rights, violated Brecht's right to due process
of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.3 2 The appellate court concluded that the State's comments were not harmless
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1714-15 (1993).
Brecht, 421 N.W.2d at 103. The State first inquired of Brecht:
"Q. In fact the first time you have ever told this story is when you testified here today was it not? ....
A. You mean the story of actually what happened?
Q. Yes.
A. I knew what happened, I'm just telling it the way it happened, yes, I
didn't have a chance to talk to anyone, I didn't want to call somebody
from a phone and give up my rights, so I didn't want to talk about it, no
sir."
Id. On re-cross examination, the State asked Brecht:
"Q. Did you tell anyone about what had happened in Alma?
A. No I did not."
Id.
30 Id. Specifically, the prosecutor stated:
"[A] nd remember that Mr. Brecht never volunteered until in this courtroom what happened in the Hartman residence....
28
29

He sits back here and sees all of our evidence go in and then comes out
with this crazy story....
I know what I'd say, I'd say, I'd say 'hold on, this was a mistake, this was
an accident, let me tell you what happened,' but he didn't say that did
he. No, he waited until he hears our story."
Id.
Id. at 99.
State v. Brecht, 405 N.W.2d 718, 722-23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 421 N.W.2d
96 (Wis. 1988) (citing Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 290-93 (1986)).
Although the appellate court focused on the State's impeachment use of Brecht's
post-arrest, pre-Miranda failure to explain his actions, the court noted, for the purpose of aiding a retrial, that the trial court's admission of evidence concerning
Brecht's homosexuality, as well as his prior convictions for passing bad checks, also
constituted error. Id. at 721-22, 724. The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded, however, that the references to Brecht's post-arrest, pre-Mirandasilence violated neither
the United States Constitution nor the Wisconsin Constitution. Brecht, 421 N.W.2d at
103 (citation omitted). Additionally, on habeas review, the district court concluded
that Brecht's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had not been violated. Brecht
v. Abrahamson, 759 F. Supp. 500, 507 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 944 F.2d 1363, 1375 (7th Cir.
1991), affd, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (1993).
31
32
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the harmless-error analysis adbeyond a reasonable doubt under
3
vanced in Chapman v. California.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with the
lower court that the State's references to Brecht's post-arrest, postMirandasilence were constitutional errors, but concluded that the
errors were harmless.3 4 In finding the error harmless, the court
weighed the infrequency of the State's impermissible references
against the overwhelming evidence of Brecht's guilt.35
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Brecht filed for habeas corpus
relief.36 Brecht alleged several federal constitutional violations, including that the State's comments on his pre-trial silence impinged
his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.3 7 The district court
agreed with both state courts that the post-arrest, post-Mirandareferences were constitutional violations of Brecht's right to due process of law.3 8 The district court, however, disagreed with the
33 Brecht, 405 N.W.2d at 722 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22
(1967)); see State v. Fencl, 325 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Wis. 1982) (articulating Wisconsin's
harmless-error standard). Under Fencl, a constitutional error was deemed harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt "if there is no reasonable possibility that the error might
have contributed to the conviction." Fencl, 325 N.W.2d at 711 (citing Chapman, 386
U.S. at 23-24. The Wisconsin standard inquired into: "(1) the frequency of the error;
(2) the nature of the State's evidence against the defendant; and (3) the nature of the
defense." Id. (citing Rudolph v. State, 254 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Wis. 1977) (per
curiam)).
34 Brecht, 421 N.W.2d at 104, 106. In Doyle v. Ohio, the United States Supreme
Court held that the use of a defendant's silence for impeachment purposes after he
had been informed of his right to remain silent, pursuant to Miranda, constituted a
violation of due process and was fundamentally unfair. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,
618 (1976). The Doyle Court found an implicit assurance in the Miranda warnings
that silence could not be used against a person invoking that right. Id.
35 Brecht, 421 N.W.2d at 104. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the
strength of the evidence the State presented against Brecht. Id. Particularly, the
court observed that Brecht fled without obtaining assistance for the wounded Hartman, that the officers who examined the Hartmans' house failed to find anything that
would have caused Brecht to trip, and that the coroner concluded that Brecht's version of the incident was not consistent with the trajectory of the bullet in Hartman's
back. Id. The supreme court also noted that the State had established the existence
of a motive-Hartman's disapproval of Brecht's homosexuality. Id. at 104, 105-06.
36 Brecht, 759 F. Supp. at 501. See supra note 3 (providing the pertinent parts of
§ 2254).
37 Brecht, 759 F. Supp. at 501. In his habeas petition, Brecht also alleged that his
rights to due process were violated by the prosecutor's comments regarding Brecht's
homosexuality and a previous criminal conviction, and by the State's use of an ex parte
trial brief. Id.
38 Id. at 507. The district court also agreed with the Wisconsin Supreme Court
that the State's references to Brecht's failure to mention the shooting either to Officer Zeller or Mr. Schlesselman or to explain his statements to Officer Papke were
not constitutional errors. Id. (citations omitted). Because of the prosecution's comments on Brecht's homosexuality and previous criminal convictions, the district court
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Wisconsin Supreme Court on the issue of whether the State's error
harmed Brecht and found that the State had not proven the error
3 9
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Kotteakos v. United States harmless-error standard
applied to habeas review and required the reviewing court to determine whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."4' The court of appeals
asserted that the federal habeas process is a separate, distinct, and
costly action that should not merely review state court results in the
manner of direct review.4" The court further reasoned that Doyle v.
Ohio42 established a prophylactic rule of the rights outlined by the
Supreme Court in Miranda, which were not rights expressly
granted by the Constitution.4 3 Accordingly, the court of appeals
concluded that a less burdensome harmless-error standard was applicable to collateral review of prophylactic rules and that Brecht
had not, in fact, demonstrated that he had been harmed by the
concluded that Brecht was entitled to habeas relief. Id. at 509. The district court,
however, rejected Brecht's claim regarding the use of the ex partebrief. Id. at 509-10.
39 Id. at 508. Recognizing that Brecht's intent was the only real issue during the
trial, the district court posited that the State's impermissible remarks may have swayed
the jury. Id. (citations omitted). The district court also disagreed with the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's determination that the State presented overwhelming evidence of
Brecht's guilt. Id.
40 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1375 (7th Cir. 1991.) (quoting Kotteakos
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449
(1986)), aff'd, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (1993).
41 Id. at 1370-75. The court relied primarily on Stone v. Powell for the notion that
the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, does not require that the same standards
that state reviewing courts apply on direct review must also be applied on collateral
review. Id. at 1371 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976)). See infra
notes 62-72 and accompanying text for a complete analysis of the Stone decision.
42 426 U.S. 610 (1976). See supra note 34 (discussing the Doyle holding).
43 Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1370. A prophylactic rule is "a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). A prophylactic rule "functions as a preventive safeguard to insure that constitutional violations will not occur."
Joseph D. Grano, ProphylacticRules In CriminalProcedure: A Question OfArticle III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100, 105 (1985). Professor Grano stated that "particularly in
criminal procedure cases, the Supreme Court has developed 'a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from,
but not required by, various constitutional provisions.'" Id. at 101 (quoting Henry P.
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1975)). Explaining the theoretical underpinnings of prophylactic rules, Professor Stuntz declared that "[b]y definition, a prophylactic rule forbids
more behavior than would be forbidden if detecting and preventing truly objectionable behavior were costless." William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights In CriminalProcedure,75
VA. L. lEv. 761, 767 n.19 (1989).
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State's references to his silence."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 45 to resolve the dispute between the Seventh and Eighth Circuits regarding the proper harmless-error standard applicable to habeas review
of state convictions where the petitioner alleges a violation of
Doyle.46 Affirming the Seventh Circuit's decision, the Court rejected the lower court's reasoning that the Doyle rule existed solely
as protection for the rights enunciated in Miranda.47 Doyle, the
Court observed, stood for the proposition that a defendant is to be
accorded due process and treated fairly.4" The Court then concluded that the "substantial and injurious effect or influence"
harmless-error standard applied to Doyle violations.4 9 Applying this
standard, the Court determined that the State's impermissible use
of Brecht's pre-trial silence did not have a meaningful effect on the
jury's determination of his guilt.5 °
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was followed by nearly a century of Supreme Court decisions narrowly interpreting the scope of
habeas relief.5 Early applications of the 1867 Act were limited to
situations in which the petitioner alleged a flaw in the jurisdiction
of the convicting court.5 2 In 1942, the Supreme Court abandoned
44 Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1375, 1376. The court of appeals acknowledged that its decision conflicted with a recent Eighth Circuit decision, Bass v. Nix. Id. at 1375 (citing
Bass v. Nix, 909 F.2d 297, 304-05 & n.14 (8th Cir. 1990)). In Bass, the Eighth Circuit
also dealt with a prosecutor's efforts to impeach a defendant by cross-examining the
defendant on why he did not offer his version of the alleged incident until trial. Bass,
909 F.2d at 300. After concluding that Bass's Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process had been violated under Doyle, the Eighth Circuit then turned to the issue of
the Doyle violation's effect on Bass. Id. at 301-04, 304. The Eighth Circuit noted the
Supreme Court's failure to address the issue of the proper "standard of review for
evaluating the prejudicial effect of a Doyle violation." Id. at 304 (citing Greer v. Miller,
483 U.S. 756, 761 n.3 (1987)). The Bass court determined that the "harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard was appropriate for Doyle violations. Id. at 304-05 (citing
Clark v. Wood, 823 F.2d 1241, 1247 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987); United
States v. Disbrow, 768 F.2d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1985)). Consequently, the Eighth Circuit rejected an "actual prejudice" harmless-error standard. Id. at 305 n.14 (citing
Miller v. Greer, 789 F.2d 438, 448 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 756 (1987)).
45 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 112 S. Ct. 2937 (1992).
46 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (1993). See supra note 44 (discussing the conflicting decisions in the circuit courts).
47 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717.
48 Id.

49 Id. at 1722.
50 Id. at 1722-23.
51 WAYNE R L,FAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.2(b), at 1016,
§ 27.3, at 1023 (Student ed. 1985).
52 Id. § 27.3, at 1023. In Ex pare Lange the trial court's attempt to correct a sentencing error by resentencing the petitioner was alleged to constitute punishing the
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the jurisdictional defect requirement and extended the availability
of habeas relief to state prisoners who simply alleged that their convictions had been obtained in violation of the Constitution.5 3 Approximately ten years later, the Court dramatically expanded the
scope of habeas corpus by holding that the federal courts could
entertain habeas petitions asserting claims that had already been
addressed by state courts.5 4
Ninety-six years of court efforts to expand the availability of
habeas relief culminated in the landmark case of Fay v. Noia.55 In
petitioner twice for the same offense. ExparteLange,85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 164,168
(1873). Lange's original sentence for theft crimes included a prison term and a monetary fine. Id. at 164. The statute under which Lange was sentenced, however, authorized punishment of either imprisonment or monetary fines. Id. Five days after
Lange entered prison and four days after he paid the fine, the trial judge vacated the
sentence and resentenced Lange to a year in prison. Id. The United States Supreme
Court granted Lange's habeas petition, emphasizing the inherent unlawfulness in
punishing a man twice for the same offense. Id. at 168. Once Lange had fully satisfied one of the prescribed alternative punishments by paying the fine, the Court explained, the trial court no longer had authority to resentence him. Id. at 176. The
Supreme Court asserted that the trial court had no jurisdiction to impose a new or
additional sentence on Lange and the attempt to do so was void. Id. at 176-77. Additionally, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court responded to a habeas petition alleging a violation of the right to counsel by stating: "If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is
not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of
conviction pronounced by a court withoutjurisdiction is void...." Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938); see also Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923) (concluding that a court in a mob-dominated trial departed from due process of law and
was without jurisdiction to convict) (citation omitted).
53 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942). Waley, convicted of kidnapping, alleged in his habeas petition that his guilty plea had been coerced by federal
law enforcement agents. Id. at 102. Concluding that Waley's claim was cognizable on
habeas review, the Court noted that Waley's allegations were based on facts outside
the record and thus not appealable on direct review. Id. at 104. Specifically, the
Waley Court stated:
In such circumstances... [habeas review] is not restricted to those cases
where the judgment of conviction is void for want ofjurisdiction of the
trial court to render it. [Habeas review] extends also to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective
means of preserving his rights.
Id. at 104-05 (citations omitted).
54 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463-65 (1953). The Brown Court recognized that
the federal district courts, located in the state where a challenged conviction was
reached, were in an opportune position to review state proceedings. Id. at 458. Construing the federal habeas statue, the Court noted that Congress did not reference the
relevance of state court results when granting federal courts the right to hear habeas
petitions. Id. at 462 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988)).
55 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, I IlS. Ct. 2546 (1991).
Judge Gibbons, former Chief Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, perceived Fay as the launching pad for much of the Warren Court's
criminal procedure jurisprudence. John J. Gibbons, Waiver: The Quest For Functional
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Fay, the Court addressed whether the petitioner was to be granted
habeas relief despite a failure to appeal his conviction.5 6 The
Supreme Court held that the federal courts could entertain applications for habeas relief where the petitioner had defaulted on
state court remedies, provided that the failure to pursue those remedies was not deliberate or motivated by bad faith.5 7
After extensively reviewing the historical applications of
habeas corpus, 8 the Fay Court concluded that there was no indication that federal courts were barred from granting habeas relief by
Limitations On Habeas CorpusJurisdiction,2 SETON HALL L. REv. 291, 294 (1971) (footnote omitted). Judge Gibbons also opined that Fay foreshadowed the result reached
in Chapman v. California. Id. at 294-95 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967)). As for the practical effect of Fay, Judge Gibbons noted a nearly five-fold
increase in the number of habeas petitions filed from 1963, the year Fay was decided,
to 1970. Id. at 294.
56 Fay, 372 U.S. at 394. The petitioner, Noia, along with two other men, had been
convicted of felony murder. Id. Noia's cohorts unsuccessfully appealed their convictions in the New York state courts alleging that their confessions, the sole evidence
against the three defendants, had been coerced. Id. at 395 & n.1 (citations omitted).
One of Noia's co-defendants obtained federal habeas corpus relief and the other's
conviction was subsequently overturned in state court proceedings. Id. at 395 n.1
(citations omitted). Noia then sought post-conviction relief in the New York state
courts, but was unsuccessful because he had failed to appeal his conviction. Id. at 396
n.3 (citations omitted). Noia contended that his failure to appeal was motivated by
his desire not to burden his family with the costs of an appeal and also because he
feared receiving the death penalty if he was granted a retrial. Id. at 397 n.3. The
district court denied Noia's habeas petition, despite the State's stipulation that Noia's
confession had been, in fact, coerced. Id. at 395-96 & n.2. The district court concluded that Noia did not satisfy the requirement of the federal habeas statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2254, that he first exhaust all potential state remedies. United States v. Fay,
183 F. Supp. 222, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd, 300 F.2d 345, 365 (2d Cir. 1962), affd,
372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
57 Fay, 372 U.S. at 438.
58 Id. at 399-426. Justice Brennan asserted that early applications of habeas corpus
were not limited solely to questions involving jurisdiction. Id. at 404. TheJustice also
argued that the Constitution granted broad authority to courts on habeas review, stating that "the Constitution invites, if it does not compel,.., a generous construction of
the power of the federal courts to dispense the writ" in conformity with the common
law, which Justice Brennan construed as affording habeas review "to remedy any kind
of governmental restraint contrary to fundamental law." Id. at 405-06 (citation omitted). Circumstances surrounding the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, Justice Brennan
contended, indicated that it was Congress's intent to expand the scope of habeas
review substantially. Id. at 415-17, 417. Justice Brennan asserted that the 1867 Act was
Congress's response to anticipated southern defiance during Reconstruction, and the
Act was intended as "a remedy almost in the nature of removal from the state to the
federal courts of state prisoners' constitutional contentions." Id. at 416 (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted). Justice Brennan cited a 17th century case as a common
law example of habeas corpus relief being granted where a person had been illegally
imprisoned in violation of the due process principles accorded by the Magna Carta.
Id. at 404-05 (citation omitted).
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state procedural requirements.5 9 Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, acknowledged that state procedural requirements could
have the effect of barring direct review of federal constitutional
claims, but the Justice reasoned that habeas corpus was a distinct
process, derived from the principle of personal liberty, and thus
subject to a different standard.6 The Fay Court limited its holding
by noting that the power of a reviewing judge to grant relief is discretionary and that in instances where a petitioner has deliberately
rejected state remedies, the reviewing court may deny relief.6 '
The expansion of habeas availability came to an abrupt halt
with the Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell.62 In Stone, two
petitions for habeas relief were filed, both alleging that evidence
4
3
subject to the exclusionary rule6 had been presented at trial.
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell held that violations of the exclusionary rule were not reviewable on habeas corpus, provided
that the state had allowed the petitioner to fully present his or her
claim.65 The majority based its decision on the proposition that
59 Id. at 426. Justice Brennan stated: "Our survey discloses nothing to suggest that
the Federal District Court lacked the power to order Noia discharged because of a
procedural forfeiture he may have incurred under state law." Id. Noting that habeas
review was entirely distinct from direct review, the Justice reasoned that while respect
for state legal systems was an important consideration, that respect should not impinge on Congress's intent that habeas review be widely available. Id. at 424, 426-27.
60 Id. at 430-31. The Court stated:
[T]he broad power of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 summarily to hear the application and to "determine the facts, and dispose of
the matter as law and justice require," is hardly characteristic of an appellate jurisdiction. Habeas lies to enforce the right of personal liberty;
when that right is denied and a person confined, the federal court has
the power to release him. Indeed it has no other power; it cannot revise
the state court judgment; it can act only on the body of the petitioner.
Id. (citation omitted).
61 Id. at 438. The Court found that although Noia chose not to pursue any appeals, this default could not be considered "a deliberate circumvention of state procedures," because Noia chose not to appeal fearing that a retrial could result in the
death penalty. Id. at 439-40.
62 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
63 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). In Mapp, the Supreme Court
held that evidence obtained by law enforcement officers in violation of the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures was inadmissible
in state courts. Id. at 655. Barring the use of illegally seized evidence, the Court
stated, created a deterrent effect by removing an incentive for law enforcement officers to disregard the Constitution. Id. at 656-57 (citations omitted).
64 Stone, 428 U.S. at 470-74. Lloyd Powell's arrest for vagrancy and a search incident to that arrest yielded a handgun, which was later determined to have been used
to murder a shopkeeper. Id. at 469-70. David Rice, convicted of murder, filed for
habeas relief contending that the warrant used by police to search his home was invalid. Id. at 471, 472-73.
65 Id. at 494. The precursor to the Court's opinion in Stone was Justice Powell's
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the exclusionary rule is a prophylactic rule granted not by the Constitution, but by the courts as a means of protecting Fourth Amendment rights. 6 The Stone Court then determined that the
substantial costs attendant to application of the exclusionary rule
outweighed the limited benefit it provided in the situation at
hand.6 7
concurrence in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A
Complex Procedure for a Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1015, 1022 (1993); see
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). The
defendant in Schneckloth petitioned for habeas relief contending that the car search
producing the State's evidence was unconstitutional, despite the fact that both the
driver and the borrower of the car, in which the petitioner was travelling, consented
to the search. Id. at 219-20. The Schneckloth majority held that consent to a noncustodial search must be voluntary, without coercion or duress. Id. at 248. Justice
Powell, however, argued that the real issue was whether the exclusionary rule applied
to habeas petitions. Id. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell propounded
that collateral review should be limited to issues relating to the petitioner's guilt or
innocence. Id. at 265-66 (PowellJ., concurring). Citing recent Supreme Court cases
that expanded the scope of habeas review, Justice Powell stated:
[These cases were possibly a] justifiable evolution of the use of habeas
corpus where the one in state custody raises a constitutional claim bearing on his innocence. But the justification for disregarding the historic
scope and function of the writ is measurably less apparent in the typical
Fourth Amendment claim asserted on collateral attack. In this latter
case, a convicted defendant is most often asking society to redetermine
a matter with no bearing at all on the basic justice of his incarceration.
Id. at 256 (Powell,'J., concurring) (citing Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 231
(1969) (ruling that claims alleging illegally seized evidence used at trial are cognizable on habeas review of federal convictions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255); Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 424-27 (1963) (declaring that state procedural bars to appeal did not
preclude federal habeas review)).
In practice, courts asking whether a petitioner has received a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate a claim have applied a two-prong analysis asking: "(1) whether the
state procedural mechanism is satisfactory in the abstract, and (2) whether there was a
failure of the mechanism in the individual case." LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 51,
§ 27.3(d), at 1034. Because the state systems are modeled after the federal system,
satisfaction of the first prong is almost presumed and the test becomes subjective
relating to the second prong. Id.
66 Stone, 428 U.S. at 486. The Court quoted that a prophylactic rule was "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect." Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
348 (1974)). See supra note 43 (defining prophylactic rules).
67 Stone, 428 U.S. at 493-94. Justice Powell asserted that the most significant costs
of the exclusionary rule were its propensity to cloud the determination of guilt or
innocence and allow a guilty offender to go free. Id. at 490. The primary benefit of
the exclusionary rule, the Justice declared, was the deterrent effect the rule had on
police officers inclined to violate the Constitution. Id. at 486. Justice Powell reasoned, however, that the benefit provided by the rule did not outweigh its costs. See
id. at 493-95. Justice Powell reiterated:
[Hiabeas corpus ...results in serious intrusions on values important to
our system of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal
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Justice Brennan dissented, condemning the Court's holding as
based not upon logic, but rather on the majority's hostility toward
the principles of habeas corpus and the exclusionary rule. 68 First,
Justice Brennan argued that the majority's distinction between direct and collateral review was unjustifiable in light of the federal
habeas statute's clear meaning. 69 The Justice then declared that
the majority's holding was motivated by a desire to "eviscerate" the
federal habeas statute. 70 Reserving particular scorn for the assertion that collateral review distracts the justice system from the central issue of a defendant's guilt, Justice Brennan dismissed the
majority's arguments regarding the costs of habeas review. 71 The
dissent argued that the sanctity of constitutional rights and the
need to safeguard those rights clearly outweighed the need for
trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded."
Id. at 491 n.31 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 259 (Powell, J., concurring)).
68 Id. at 502 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was joined by justice Marshall. Id.
69 Id. at 509-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Under Mapp, Justice Brennan argued,
the admission of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was itself an
infringement of a defendant's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Id. at 510-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accordingly, "the defendant has been placed 'in custody in violation of the Constitution.'" Id. at 509
(Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988)). Justice Brennan then
professed confusion as to the reasoning behind the majority's conclusion that a petitioner is unconstitutionally confined "during the process of direct review, no matter
how long that process takes, but that the unconstitutionality then suddenly dissipates
at the moment the claim is asserted in a collateral attack on the conviction." Id. at
509-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
70 Id. at 516 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that the Court's rationale could be found only in footnotes to the majority opinion. See id. at 516-17
(Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 478 n.11, 491-92 nn.30-31). Specifically, the dissent ridiculed the majority's "vague notions of comity and federalism."
Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 478 n.11). Justice Brennan also discredited the majority's distinction of guilt related and non-guilt related
constitutional violations. Id. at 516-17 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing Stone, 428 U.S.
at 491-92 n.31). Furthermore, the Justice foresaw the Court's holding as the beginning of "a drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction." Id. at 517 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Claims cognizable on habeas review that the dissent believed would eventually be narrowed by the Court included "double jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Mirandaviolations, and use of invalid identification procedures." Id. at 517-18
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
71 Id. at 522-23 (Brennan,J., dissenting). The dissent dismissed the majority's concern for the costs of habeas corpus as "carry[ing] no more force with respect to non'guilt-related' constitutional claims than they do with respect to claims that affect the
accuracy of the factfinding process." Id. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan noted that Congress made no provision for the costs cited by the majority.
Id. See supra note 67 (discussing the costs of habeas review).
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streamlining the judicial process.7
The evisceration of the habeas statute envisaged by Justice
Brennan, however, did not immediately follow the Stone decision.73
Instead, in Wainwright v. Sykes,7 the Court began to gradually restrict the availability of habeas review by rejecting, without overruling, Fay.75 Writing for the Sykes majority, Justice Rehnquist
concluded that to overcome a state procedural bar to appeals-the
72 See Stone, 428 U.S. at 522-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justice
noted that the Court's efforts to distinguish between guilt related and non-guilt related claims served no purpose other than to foster disrespect for the rights of the
Constitution. Id. at 524 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan reasoned that the
Court corrupted the values of the Constitution by subjugating its guarantees to the
truth finding function of trials. Id.
73 See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 51, § 27.3(b), at 1029-30. The Court's post-Stone
rulings addressed a variety of issues on habeas review without denying the
cognizability of those issues. Id. § 27.3(b), at 1029. In two of the most significant
post-Stone cases, Rose v. Mitchell and Kimmelman v. Morrison, the Court refused to extend the holding of Stone to claims that were unrelated to the guilt-determination
process. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383 (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 564 (1979); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 51, § 27.3(c), at 1030-33. In Mitchell, the respondents claimed that the foreman of the grand jury had been selected in a
discriminatory manner, thus violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 547. The State contended that, in light of Stone, the
respondents' claims were not cognizable on habeas review because grand jury proceedings had no relationship with the ultimate determination of the petitioner's guilt
or innocence. Id. at 560. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that Stone
was not applicable to an allegation of discrimination in a grand jury and that habeas
relief could be granted if the respondents established a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 564, 565. The Mitchell Court then concluded that the respondents
failed to establish such a violation. Id. at 574. Justice Blackmun, who had joined the
majority in Stone, stressed that Stone was not concerned with the scope of habeas review, but with the exclusionary rule and its applicability on collateral review. Id. at
560 (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 495-60 n.37). Noting the prophylactic nature of the
exclusionary rule, the Justice explained that claims under the Equal Protection Clause
were essentially different from those arising from the exclusionary rule. Id. at 561-62
(citation omitted).
The issue in Kimmelman was whether Stone applied to a respondent's claim for
habeas relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to a mishandling
of the exclusionary rule. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 368. Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, held that such claims were clearly within the scope of the habeas statute. See id.
at 383. The right to counsel, the Justice observed, was fundamental to the justice
system. Id. at 374 (citation omitted). In addition, Justice Brennan reasoned that the
complexities of the legal system often prevent criminal defendants from recognizing
the incompetence of their attorneys. Id. at 378 (citation omitted). Justice Brennan
asserted that restricting habeas review by applying Stone would thus hamper the
proper functioning of the Sixth Amendment. Id.
74 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
75 See Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
362, 372 n.66 (1991) ("Sykes related only to trial-type defaults, where [Fay] involved an
appellate default (failure to appeal), so that technically (Fay] was not thereby overruled."). Sykes marked the effective overruling of Fay, as it limited its holding to that
specific set of facts. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2563 (1991); Rosenberg,
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contemporaneous objection rule 7 -a habeas petitioner would be
required to show cause for his or her waiver and prejudice resulting from that waiver.7 7 The broad "deliberate bypass" standard,7"
the Court declared, failed to account for the benefits of the contemporaneous objection rule.7 9 Justice Rehnquist also claimed
that a less onerous standard for overcoming the rule encouraged
lawyers to store claims for appeal instead of airing them during the
trial.8 0
supra, at 372. For a detailed discussion of Fay, see supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
76 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(i) (1993). The federal contemporaneous objection rule
is embodied in Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and provides:
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary and for all
purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary it is sufficient that a party, at the time of the ruling or order of the court is
made or sought, makes known to the court the action which that party
desires the court to take or that party's objection to the action of the
court and the grounds therefor ....
FED. R. CRIM. P. 51 (1989). The contemporaneous objection rule provides that "an
error not raised and preserved at trial will not be considered on appeal." LAFAvE &
ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 27.5(c), at 1158.
77 Sykes, 433 U.S. at 86-87 (citation omitted). Sykes petitioned for habeas relief on
the grounds that he did not understand his Miranda warning. Id. at 75 (footnote
omitted). The issue was not raised by Sykes's counsel at trial. Id. (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court denied Sykes's petition for relief holding that the "cause-andprejudice" standard of Francisv. Henderson applied to Sykes's procedural waiver. Id. at
87 (citing Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976)). The Court, however, left
open the definition of "cause-and-prejudice," as well as the precise scope of which
procedural rules would be affected. Id. at 87-88, 88 n.12. In addition, the Court denied that its decision conflicted with Brown v. Allen, which held that habeas petitioners
were entitled to de novo review of their claims in federal court. Id. at 87 (citing Brown
v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 460-65 (1953)). Justice Rehnquist asserted that Brown was concerned with claims that had already been litigated in the state court. Id. In contrast,
the Justice reasoned, Sykes's claim had not been resolved in the state courts. Id.
78 A "deliberate bypass" or waiver of a state procedural requirement is "'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'" Id. at 83
(quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963);Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464

(1938)).
79 Id. at 88-89.
80 Id. at 89. Specifically, Justice Rehnquist referred to "sandbagging" by defense
lawyers. Id.
The "cause-and-prejudice" standard was extended to all habeas petitions filed
subsequent to a state procedural default by Engle v. Isaac. 456 U.S. 107, 134-35
(1982). In Isaac, the Court rejected the contention that the "cause-and-prejudice"
standard of Sykes should only apply to constitutional errors not relating to the
"truthfinding function of the trial," for example, the prophylactic rule of Miranda Id.
at 129 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). Specifically, the Isaac Court
stated: "The costs [of habeas review] do not depend upon the type of claim raised by
the prisoner. While the nature of a constitutional claim may affect the calculation of
cause and actual prejudice, it does not alter the need to make that threshold showing." Id.
In 1991, the Rehnquist Court explicitly overruled what was left of Fay in deciding
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The Court further eroded the scope of habeas review in
Teague v. Lane,81 holding that retroactive effect of new constitutional rules announced by the Court would generally not be available to habeas petitioners.8 2 Petitioner argued that he was entitled
whether.the deliberate bypass standard was still applicable where a prisoner had failed
to appeal. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991); see LAFAVE & ISRAEL,
supra note 2, § 28.4(e), at 1213-14. Specifically, the Coleman Court held that habeas
review was not available to any state prisoner who had defaulted on federal claims
pursuant to a state procedural rule, absent a showing of cause for the default and
prejudice resulting therefrom. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2565. The petitioner in Coleman,
facing the death penalty, defaulted on his opportunity for state post-conviction review
because his attorney inadvertently filed for review three days late. Id. at 2552-53, 2564
(citation omitted). Under the deliberate bypass standard, the Court noted, federal
habeas review was still available to Coleman. Id. at 2564. Overruling Fay, the Court
subjected Coleman to the more rigorous cause-and-prejudice standard, which Coleman was unable to satisfy. Id. at 2565, 2568. The Court asserted that Fay deemphasized the importance of comity and state procedural rules. Id. at 2565.
Judge Lay, former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, criticized the cause-and-prejudice standard as unjust, particularly in
the context of a capital punishment case. Lay, supra note 65, at 1033-34. Judge Lay
observed that the world is imperfect and that attorneys will inevitably make mistakes
affecting their clients. Id. Judge Lay questioned the need for strict enforcement of
the cause-and-prejudice standard on habeas review where, as in Coleman's case, the
attorney's mistake occurred during state direct review, and the error would have been
subject to the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 1036. The cause-and-prejudice standard,
Judge Lay asserted, does not advance or improve judicial efficiency but rather complicates the habeas process by requiring more detailed review. Id. at 1036-37.
81 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality).
82 Id. at 306, 310. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined
in the plurality opinion. Id. at 292. Justice White concurred in Parts 1,11, and III of
the plurality opinion and found the plurality's holding to be an acceptable result. Id.
at 316, 317 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred only in Part I of the plurality's decision and agreed with the plurality's holding with regards to retroactivity and collateral
review. Id. at 318 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that the plurality's decision
was a drastic and insupportable new interpretation of the scope of habeas review. Id.
at 326-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan attacked the plurality for ignoring the nature of federal habeas corpus, as enacted by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.
Id. at 327-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also stated that the plurality ignored precedent, which dictated a broad interpretation of the scope of habeas review.
Id. at 328-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Stone, Justice Brennan argued, was the only case in which the Court limited the scope of habeas review absent a
procedural default. Id. at 329 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 479 (1976)).
Furthermore, Justice Brennan asserted: "[T]he plurality's decision to ignore history and to link the availability of relief to guilt or innocence when the outcome of a
case is not 'dictated by precedent would apparently prevent a great many Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendment cases from being brought on federal habeas." Id. at 334
(Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan gave examples of previous cases that would
not have reached the Court under the plurality's new standard. Id. at 334-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 159
(1986) (implicating a criminal defendant's right to assistance of counsel); Estelle v.

1654

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1636

to retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision handed
down after he filed for habeas corpus relief.8 3 The Court, in a plurality decision by Justice O'Connor,8 4 concluded that the need for
a clear standard and the costs to society of habeas corpus relief
warranted a substantial restriction in applying decisions retroactively to habeas petitions.8 5 The plurality allowed two exceptions to
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 461 (1981) (alleging a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 29 (1978) (claiming violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause). Finally, the dissent dismissed the plurality's
emphasis on the disparate treatment of similarly situated habeas petitioners caused by
the lack of a clear retroactivity standard. Teague, 489 U.S. at 337-40 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan stated he believed that the "uniform treatment of
habeas petitioners is not worth the price the plurality is willing to pay." Id. at 339
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The Justice continued: "[I] t is at least arguably better that
the wrong done to one person be righted than that none of the injuries inflicted on
those whose convictions have become final be redressed, despite the resulting inequality in treatment." Id.
83 Teague, 489 U.S. at 294. Teague's initial habeas petition alleged that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury. Id. at 293.
During Teague's appeal of the district court's denial of habeas relief the Supreme
Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, which substantially relaxed the requirements for
establishing racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 294, 295 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97
(1986)). To establish a primafaciecase of racial discrimination in jury selection, the
Batson Court held that a petitioner would have to demonstrate that the prosecutor in
the specific case violated the Equal Protection Clause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 97. The
Batson Court rejected a standard requiring a showing of repeated instances of deliberate exclusion of jurors based on their race. Id. at 95-96 (citations omitted).
84 Teague, 489 U.S. at 292. The plurality opinion relied extensively on the opinions
ofJustice Harlan. Id. at 303-15; see Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 260-69 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (expressing Justice Harlan's views regarding the retroactive
application of rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus review). Justice O'Connor
noted Justice Harlan's recognition of distinct differences between direct and collateral review, stating that "[h]abeas corpus has always been a collateralremedy, providing
an avenue for upsetting judgments that have become otherwise final. It is not
designed as a substitute for direct review." Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (quoting Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S 667, 682-83 (1971) (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Justice O'Connor emphasized that "it is 'sounder, in adjudicating
habeas petitions, generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a conviction became
final than it is to seek to dispose of [habeas] cases on the basis of intervening changes
in constitutional interpretation.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mackey, 401
U.S. at 689 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). The plurality
expressed its agreement with Justice Harlan's view and added that considerations of
finality in the criminal justice system, as well as courtesy between the state and federal
systems, also warranted restricting the scope of habeas review. Id. at 308.
85 Teague, 489 U.S. at 305, 309-10 (citations omitted). The plurality rejected the
retroactivity analysis of Linkletter v. Walker, asserting that it produced inconsistent results. Id. at 302 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)). In Linkletter, the
Court addressed the issue of whether its decision in Mapp applied retroactively to a
habeas petition where the petitioner's conviction had become final prior to the
Court's decision. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 619-20. While retroactive application of
changes in law clearly applied to cases on direct review, retroactive application to
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the general rule of non-retroactivity.8 6 Justice O'Connor first excepted situations where a new constitutional rule proscribed certain types of primary, private-individual behavior outside the scope
of the criminal law-making power.8 7 Second, the plurality provided
for retroactive application of a new rule where the fundamental
fairness of a trial is implicated and the rule is related to the guilt
determination process."8
8 9 the Supreme Court significantly
In Chapman v. California,
broadened the scope of the harmless-error rule.9" The Chapman
Court held that certain constitutional violations did not warrant
automatic reversal of a conviction and could be subjected to harmless-error analysis. 91 As the Court increasingly favored the concases on collateral review required a deeper analysis. Id. at 627 (citations omitted).
The Court then analyzed the purpose of the new rule set forth in Mapp, the reliance
placed on the old rule, and the effect retroactive application would have on the justice system. Id. at 636. After this extensive analysis, the Linkletter Court concluded
that Mapp was not retroactively applicable. Id. at 639-40.
86 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692-93 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
87 Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places
.certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe")). The plurality found that Teague's claim
clearly did not fitinto this first exception. Id.
88 Id. at 307, 311-13 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S 319, 324-25
(1937))). The plurality relied on the reasoning of Stone to narrow the scope ofJustice
Harlan's second exception. Id. at 312, 313 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 49192 n.31)). Justice Harlan's second exception permitted retroactive application where
procedures "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'" were affected. Id. at 311
(quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 324-25)). Applying the second exception, the plurality concluded that Teague was not entitled to relief because the effect of not being
tried by a fair cross section of his peers neither impaired the fundamental fairness of
Teague's trial nor related unfavorably to the truth determination process. Id. at 315.
89 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
90 See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 7, at 82-83; LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2,

§ 27.6(c), at 1166. Chapman rests on the proposition that, given human fallibility,
"there can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and that the Constitution
does not guarantee such a trial." United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983)
(citations omitted).
91 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22. The petitioners in Chapman, Ruth Chapman and
Thomas Teale, received life imprisonment and the death penalty for their respective
roles in the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of a bartender. Id. at 18-19. Chapman
and Teale chose not to testify at their trial, and the prosecutor referred extensively to
that fact in his summation, as he was entitled to under the California Constitution. Id.
at 19. The defendants were found guilty, but before they began the appeal process,
the United States Supreme Court ruled in another case that the California practice of
commenting on the silence of defendants, as well as the provision of the California
Constitution upon which the practice was based, violated the Fifth Amendment's
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cerns of prosecutors, the reach of the harmless-error rule gradually
expanded to include almost all constitutional errors.9 2 Between
1967 and 1993, courts reviewing constitutional violations applied
the harmless-error standard announced in Chapman, which evaluated whether the effect of the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" to the defendant's interests.93 The standard applied to
non-constitutional errors was first enunciated by the Court in Kotteakos v. United States.94 The Kotteakos test required reversal where
the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."9 5
guarantee against self-incrimination. Id. at 18, 19-20 (citing Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 615 (1965)).
On appeal, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that Chapman's and
Teale's rights had been violated under Griffin. Id. at 20 (citation omitted). However,
the court applied the harmless-error provision of the state constitution and concluded that the defendants were unharmed by the error because a "miscarriage of
justice" had not occurred. Id. (footnote omitted). The United States Supreme Court
rejected the argument that constitutional errors could never be harmless, citing federal and state harmless-error rules as evidence of the acceptance and worth of the
rule. Id. at 21-22. The Court stated: "[T]here may be some constitutional errors
which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they
may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the
automatic reversal of the conviction." Id. at 22. The Chapman Court recognized that
some constitutional violations could never be harmless. Id. at 23. See infra note 100
(listing constitutional errors affecting a party's substantial rights that are not subject
to harmless-error analysis). The Court determined that the appropriate standard for
harmlessness required the reviewing court to "be able to declare a belief that [the
error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman,386 U.S. at 24. The Court
concluded that it could not be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants
were unharmed by the prosecutor's statements. Id. at 26.
92 Stacy & Dayton, supra note 7, at 79-80, 80 n.7 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570, 578-79 (1986) (citing Hasting,461 U.S. at 509)). The Rose Court stated that constitutional errors not subject to harmless-error analysis were the exception rather than
the rule. Rose, 478 U.S. at 578-79 (citation omitted). The Court noted that if the
accused had been represented by counsel before an impartial judge, then "there is a
strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis." Id. at 579.
93 See Rose, 478 U.S. at 576-79; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
94 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946). In Kotteakos, the petitioners had been tried pursuant to an indictment charging a single conspiracy when, in fact, several separate conspiracies had operated. Id. at 752, 755 (citations omitted). At issue was whether the
error affected the substantial rights of the parties. Id. at 752. The Kotteakos Court
concluded that the proper analysis considered the error's effect on the outcome of
the trial, and not the nature of the error. Id. at 764. Refining this conclusion, Justice
Rutledge, writing for the Court, stated: "The inquiry cannot be merely whether there
was enough [evidence] to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the
error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence." Id. at
765.
95 Id. at 764-65, 776. Applying the Kotteakos standard in 1986, the Supreme Court
held that improper joinder, a non-constitutional trial error, affected substantial rights
and was subject to harmless-error analysis. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449
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Twenty-two years after Chapman, the Supreme Court markedly
expanded the scope of the harmless-error rule in Arizona v. Fulminante.96 The FulminanteCourt held that the use of a coerced confession at trial in violation of the Due Process Clause was subject to
the harmless-error standard of Chapman.9 7 Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist" first expounded the vast body of decisions applying harmless-error analysis to various issues.99 Acknowledging Chapman's warning that some types of constitutional
violations, including the use of a coerced confession, could never
be harmless, the Chief Justice asserted that Chapman did not affirmatively bar applying harmless-error analysis to the use of a coerced confession. 100
(1986). The Lane Court then concluded that a limiting jury charge prevented the
error from substantially influencing the jury's verdict. Id. at 450.
96 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
97 Id. at 1264, 1266. Fulminante was a suspect in the Arizona murder of his stepdaughter. Id. at 1250. Fulminante was not charged with the murder, and he left
Arizona for NewJersey, where he was later convicted of a federal firearms offense. Id.
In prison, another inmate, a former police officer and a paid Federal Bureau of Investigation informant, was instructed to inquire into the fate of Fulminante's stepdaughter. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court both
concluded that Fulminante's confession to the inmate that he murdered his stepdaughter was coerced. Id. at 1252-53 (footnote omitted). The Court discerned that
the confession was motivated by Fulminante's fear of other prisoners and the inmate's
offer of protection in exchange for a confession. Id. at 1253.
98 Chief Justice Rehnquist authored Part II for the Court and filed a dissent as to
Parts I and III. Id. at 1249, 1261-66. Justice White delivered Parts I, II, and IV of the
Court's opinion. Id. at 1248, 1250-53, 1257-61. The Justice, however, dissented as to
Part III. Id. at 1253-57 (WhiteJ., dissenting). Justice Kennedy concurred in thejudgment. Id. at 1266-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
99 Id. at 1263 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579-80
(1986) (determining that ajury instruction that wrongly created a presumption regarding the defendant's mental state was not so fundamental to a fair trial that harmless-error analysis was precluded).
100 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1264 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23
(1967)). But see id. at 1253, 1253-57 (White, J., dissenting) (asserting that the harmless-error rule cannot be applied to coerced confessions that have been erroneously
admitted). The Chapman Court stated: "[O]ur prior cases have indicated that there
are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be
treated as harmless error .... " Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (declaring that indigent defendants have a constitutional
right to counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958) (concluding that a
coerced confession deprived the defendant of due process of law); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (holding that constitutional due process of law requires an
impartial judge)). Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the Chapman Court referred
to the impermissible applications for "historical" purposes. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at
1264. The Chief Justice then declared that Payne rejected a sufficiency of the evidence standard and did not act to bar findings of harmlessness. Id. (citing Payne, 356
U.S. at 567-68); see Payne, 356 U.S. at 568 (stating that where a coerced confession was
part of the evidence presented to a jury, the effect of such evidence on the jury was
not measurable, and accordingly, "even though there may have been sufficient evi-
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The Fulminante majority then declared that constitutional errors were classifiable as either "structural errors" or "trial errors."' 0 '
A trial error, the Court posited, occurred during the presentation
of a case to the jury and was capable of being "quantitatively assessed" to measure its effect on a trial and thus amenable to harmless-error analysis. 10 2 In contrast, the Court explained, structural
errors affected the integrity of the entire trial process and therefore could not be subjected to harmless-error analysis.'
dence, apart from the coerced confession, to support a judgment of conviction, the
admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the judgment
because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment") (footnote
omitted). In Fulminante,Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that the Payne Court rejected not a strict Chapman style analysis of the error, "but a much more lenient rule
which would allow affirmance of a conviction if the evidence other than the involuntary confession was sufficient to sustain the verdict." Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1264.
In dissent, Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
chastened the majority for abandoning the proposition that the use of a coerced confession could never be harmless. Id. at 1253 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White
stated that the majority had abandoned the principle that "'a defendant in a criminal
case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part,
upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession.'" Id. (citation omitted). Justice White asserted that precedent dictated that the
majority's result was an "'impermissible doctrine.'" Id. (quoting Lynkmn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528, 537 (1963)). Citing the body of law dictating that the use of a coerced
confession violates due process, Justice White assailed the majority for making such a
monumental change without adequately explaining its reasons. Id. at 1253-54 (White,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
The dissent also reasoned that the use of coerced confessions could undermine
the guilt-determination function of trials. Id. at 1255-56 (White, J., dissenting). The
dissent asserted that coerced confessions are not inherently trustworthy and thus their
"admission . . . may distort the truth-seeking function of the trial upon which the
majorityfocus[ed]." Id. at 1256 (White,J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Finally, the
dissent asserted that the majority's decision was inconsistent with society's vision of
justice. Id. at 1256-57 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White observed that the Court's
previous decisions relating to coerced confessions reflected society's "'strongly felt
attitude ... that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused
against his will.'" Id. at 1256 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960)).
101 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1264-65. The dissent characterized the majority's distinction of structural error and trial error as meaningless. Id. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the majority's definition of a trial error
unjustifiably assumed that all constitutional errors could be easily classified into one
of two seemingly exclusive categories. Id. at 1254-55 (White, J., dissenting). Compare
Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789-90 (1979) (holding that failure to instruct the
jury on the presumption of innocence was subject to harmless-error analysis) with
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1979) (concluding that failure to instruct
the jury on the reasonable doubt standard was not reviewable under the harmlesserror doctrine).
102 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1264.
103 Id. at 1264-65 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963); Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)). The Chief Justice stated that structural errors "af-
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Against this background, the United States Supreme Court addressed the doctrines of both habeas corpus and harmless-error in
Brecht v. Abrahamson.104 The issue, a source of conflict among the
circuit courts, was the correct harmless-error standard applicable
to the collateral review of violations of a suspect's right not to incriminate himself.1" 5 The Court adopted the substantial prejudice
"harmless beyond a reasonstandard of Kotteakos rather than the
10 6
able doubt" standard of Chapman.
0 7 comWriting for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
menced the Court's analysis by examining the Court's holding in
Doyle, which had provided the basis for Brecht's appeals on both
the state and federal level.10 8 The Court summarily dismissed the
Seventh Circuit's characterization of Doyle as a prophylactic rule. 10 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that Doyle stood for the
proposition that it is inherently unfair to impeach the testimony of
a defendant with post-arrest silence after assuring him of his right
to remain silent and that any silence would not be used against
him.1 10 In the case at bar, the Court noted that while the prosecutor's references to Brecht's failure to offer any explanation prior to
his receiving Miranda rights were obviously permissible, the referfect[ed] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply... the trial
process itself." Id. at 1265; see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 255-56 (1986)
(alleging discrimination during grand jury proceedings); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465
U.S. 168, 170 (1984) (seeking a right to self-representation); Waller v. Georgia, 467
U.S. 39, 40-41 (1984) (asserting the right to a public trial).
104 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
Compare Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944
105 Id. at 1713-14, 1716 (citations omitted).
F.2d 1363, 1375 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the substantial and injurious effect or
influence standard was appropriate when reviewing Doyle violations), aff'd, 113 S. Ct.
1710 (1993) with Bass v. Nix, 909 F.2d 297, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying the
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to Doyle violations).
106 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1716, 1724.
107 Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in the majority opinion.
Id. at 1713.
108 Id. at 1716-17. See supra note 34 (discussing Doyle).
109 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717. In StoneJustice Powell characterized the exclusionary
rule of Mapp as a prophylactic rule. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-87 (1976). A
prophylactic rule, Justice Powell explained, was not found in the Constitution, afforded no personal rights, and was not intended to redress any wrong. Id. at 486
(citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965)). Having established what a
prophylactic rule was not,Justice Powell asserted that a prophylactic rule was instead a
'"judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974)). The Stone Court submitted that the prophylactic effect of the exclusionary rule-deterring state violations-was extremely diminished where a habeas
review could occur possibly years after a petitioner's original trial. Id. at 493.
110 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1716 (quoting Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292
(1986)).
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ences to Brecht's post-Mirandasilence clearly violated Doyle."1
Having rejected the court of appeals's characterization of Doyle
as a prophylactic rule,1 12 Chief Justice Rehnquist posited that the
proper framework for viewing Doyle violations was to categorize the
violation as either a "structural error" or a "trial error." 13 Structural errors, the Court noted, are errors that have such a negative
impact on the whole essence of a fair trial that their occurrence
can never be viewed as harmless.1 1 4 The Court explained that trial
errors are viewed as quantifiable, a quality that allows courts to
make an objective determination of an error's impact on the jury,
and are therefore subject to harmless-error analysis.1 15 The majority determined that the prosecutor's comments concerning
Brecht's pre-trial silence were trial-type constitutional violations. 1 6
Turning to the issue of the appropriate harmless-error standard, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the question presented
was one of first impression because previous cases applying the
harmless-error rule did not address the application of the Chapman
standard to habeas petitions. 1 7 The Court acknowledged that the

I11Id. at 1716-17. The ChiefJustice posited that if the shooting really was an accident, Brecht should have explained so immediately. Id. at 1717. Accordingly, the
Court determined that the State properly impeached Brecht's account by questioning
why there was no immediate explanation. Id. at 1716-17. In contrast, Chief Justice
Rehnquist reasoned, once Brecht was informed of his Miranda rights, he was entitled
to rely on the substance of those rights. Id. at 1717.
112 Id. The Court quoted the lower court's reasoning that "Doyle is... a prophylactic rule designed to protect another prophylactic rule from erosion or misuse." Id.
(quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1370 (7th Cir. 1991)). Chief Justice
Rehnquist refuted this construction, stating that Doyle was not simply a further extension of the Miranda prophylactic rule, but rather "it
is rooted in fundamental fairness
and due process concerns." Id.
113 Id. (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991)). See supra
notes 101-03 and accompanying text (evaluating the differences between trial errors
and structural errors).
114 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717 (quoting Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1254). Chapman
acknowledged that some constitutional errors were so egregious that a harmless-error
analysis simply could not be applied. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
See supra note 100 (listing constitutional errors not amenable to harmless-error
analysis).
115 Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1717 (quoting Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1264) ("Trial error
'occur(s] during the presentation of the case to the jury, and ...may therefore be
quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'")).
116 Id. The ChiefJustice stated the majority thought that a "Doyle error fits squarely
into the category of constitutional violation which [the Supreme Court] categorized as
"'trial error.'" Id. (citing Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1264-65).
117 Id. at 1718 (citing Yates v. Evatt, 111 S.Ct. 1884 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570 (1986); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S.
523 (1968)). ChiefJustice Rehnquist explained that in previous cases, the Court simply had not questioned Chapman as the only harmless-error standard applicable on
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habeas corpus statute provided only the means for state prisoners
to reach federal courts and offered scant guidance on the methods
of collateral review."1 ' Given the broad nature of the habeas statute, the Chief Justice declared that it was the role of the Court to
specify in areas where the statute was silent.1 1 9
The majority then began a general discussion of habeas review
by stating that direct review and collateral review are separate and
distinct processes.1 2 0 Direct review fills the primary role of the
post-conviction process, the Court explained, while federal habeas
review holds a supporting role as a remedy for those persons who
21
have been subjected to egregious failures of state legal systems.'
Given this role of habeas corpus, the Court concluded that errors
were reviewable on collateral appeal according to less strict standards than those applicable on direct appeal. 12 2 The majorityjusticollateral review. Id. For example, in Rose v. Clark, the issue was whether the harmless-error standard applied to jury instructions. Rose, 478 U.S. at 572 (citations omitted). In addition, the Brecht Court dismissed Brecht's argument that stare decisis
precluded a finding that the "substantial and injurious effect" standard of Kotteakos
applied. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718. But the Court noted that the issue of which standard was applicable had not been previously addressed. Id. (citation omitted). The
Court also spurned Brecht's reasoning that Congress's rejection of past efforts to apply a less burdensome standard of harmless-error review to habeas petitions
amounted to tacit approval of the Chapman standard's continued application. Id. at
1718-19.
118 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718. See supra note 3 (providing the text of specific provisions of the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255). The federal statute has
basically remained unchanged since 1867 and Congress has not significantly reacted
to the Court's varying interpretations of the statute. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note
51, § 27.2(c), at 1017.
119 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719 (citations omitted). For example, in Sanders v. United
States, the Court stated that "the judicial and statutory evolution of the principles governing successive applications for federal habeas corpus and motions under [28
U.S.C.] § 2255 has reached the point at which the formulation of basic rules to guide
the lower federal courts is both feasible and desirable." Sanders v. United States, 373
U.S. 1, 15 (1963) (citation omitted).
120 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719 (citing Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2490 (1992);
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57
(1987); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)). Contra Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 509-11 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Stone Court's distinction between direct
and collateral review was unjustifiable in light of the federal habeas statute's clear
meaning).
121 See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719. The Chief Justice emphasized: "Direct review is
the principal avenue for challenging a conviction. 'The role of federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited.'" Id. (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)).
122 Id. at 1720-22. With regard to other issues, the ChiefJustice noted, habeas petitions were subject to different standards from cases on direct review. Id. at 1720; see,
e.g., Teague, 489 U.S. at 305-10 (positing that habeas petitioners cannot obtain retroactive application of favorable decisions handed down after having received final judg-
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fled disparate treatment of cases on collateral review by
emphasizing the importance of finality in the criminal justice system, a goal thwarted by extensive habeas review, 123 1 as
well as the
24
need for federal deference to state judicial systems.
Next, Chief Justice Rehnquist analyzed the relative costs and
benefits of applying the Chapman harmless-error rule, noting that
Brecht had now aired his claims.before six courts. 12 The majority
asserted that there was no reason to doubt the state courts' competence and integrity in their adjudication of the issue. 1 6 The Court
reiterated the values of finality and respect for state legal systems. 1 27 The Chief Justice emphasized that, given the role of
habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy, the Chapman standard
ment); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (holding that violations of the
exclusionary rule were not cognizable on collateral review).
123 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1720 (citing Wright, 112 S. Ct. at 2486-92; McCleskey v. Zant,
111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468-69 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)); cf
Sanders, 373 U.S. at 24-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that criminal defendants, as
well as society, "have an interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on whether the
prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community"). See generally Paul M.
Bator, FinalityIn CriminalLaw And FederalHabeas Corpus ForState Prisoners,76 HIARv. L.
REv. 441, 525-28 (1963) (arguing that federal habeas corpus should not be used as a
means of merely rehashing issues which have already been adjudicated in state
courts).
124 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1720 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)); see
also Bator, supra note 123, at 523 (arguing that the Court's message, in Brown v. Allen,
to the state courts was that "no matter how conscientiously and fairly [state courts
applied] themselves to the consideration of the merits of federal claims, whether
presented at trial or on postconviction process, they will nevertheless automatically be
second-guessed by federal district courts as to their conclusions of law and, possibly,
factfindings, too").
125 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721-22. The issue was reviewed by the trial court, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Federal District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and
finally, the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 1714-16, 1721.
126 Id. at 1721. In addition, the Chief Justice noted that the "state courts often
occupy a superior vantage point from which to evaluate the effect of trial error." Id.
(citing Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120 (1983) (per curiam)); cf. Stone, 428 U.S. at
494 (barring habeas relief where "the State has provided an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim") (footnote omitted). Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejected Brecht's argument that the Chapman standard had any deterrent
effect. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721. Absent specific allegations that lower courts were
abusing their positions, the Chief Justice opined, the Court would not assume any
need for deterrence. Id. (citation omitted). The Brecht Court explained: "Federalism, comity, and the constitutional obligation of state and federal courts all counsel
against any presumption that a decision of this Court will 'deter' lower federal or state
courts from fully performing their sworn duty." Id. (citing Engle, 456 U.S. at 128;
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 263-65 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
127 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721.
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was too unforgiving in its effect on prosecutors' errors. 2 ' Finally,
the Court 29stressed the cost to society of allowing cases to drag out
for years.

1

In light of these considerations, the Court ruled that the "less
onerous" Kotteakos harmless-error standard applied to habeas
corpus petitions alleging trial-type constitutional errors and asked

whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."13 ' The majority reasoned
that the decision was consistent with its vision of habeas jurisprudence.131 The Court also declared that ample case law existed con-

cerning the federal harmless-error statute as guidance for future
applications of the Court's holding. 1 32 Applying the Kotteakos standard to the facts, the Court concluded that the prosecution's impermissible use of Brecht's post-Miranda silence did not

substantially sway the jury's determination.133 The Court found
Brecht's early failures to explain his actions and the pre-Miranda

silence utilized by the State at trial as highly probative of Brecht's
guilt.' 34 Additionally, the majority emphasized35 that the State
presented substantial evidence of Brecht's guilt.'

Justice Stevens, concurring, supported the Court's holding by
Id.
129 Id. The majority stated that such costs included "the expenditure of additional
time and resources for all the parties involved, the 'erosion of memory' and 'dispersion of witnesses' which accompany the passage of time and make obtaining convictions on retrial more difficult, and the frustration of 'society's interest in the prompt
administration of justice.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72
(1986) (quotations omitted)). The majority also lamented the lack of any statute of
limitation applying to habeas reviews. Id.
130 Id. at 1721-22 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
The Court emphasized that habeas petitioners would not be eligible for relief without
showing that the error actually caused harm. Id. at 1722 (citing United States v. Lane,
474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). The Court left open the possibility that a trial-type constitutional error could potentially be so outrageous as to have the effect of a structuraltype error, "so infect[ing] the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of
habeas relief." Id. at 1722 n.9. Such an error, the Chief Justice observed, would warrant granting relief even absent a showing that the jury was influenced by the error.
Id. (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 769 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating
that the possibility existed for "extraordinary cases in which the Doyle error is so egregious, or is combined with other errors or incidents of prosecutorial misconduct, that
the integrity of the process is called into question")).
131 Id. at 1722.
132 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988)). See supra note 10 (discussing the federal
harmless-error rule).
133 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722.
134 Id.
135 Id. The Chief Justice cited several inconsistencies between Brecht's version of
the event and the determinations of investigators. See id. The Court also observed
that the prosecution had established a motive for the killing. Id.
128
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emphasizing that the substantial prejudice standard provided more
than merely nominal protection of state prisoners' interests x3 6
The Justice noted that the Court's decision in Kotteakos placed the
burden of proving an error's harmlessness upon the prosecution. 3 7 Justice Stevens further emphasized that the new standard
required a fresh review of the record to determine an error's effect
on the jury.1 8 While the Kotteakos standard was more forgiving to
prosecutors than Chapman, given effective and fair application, the
sufficiently proconcurrence concluded that the new standard
9
tected the interests of habeas petitioners.1
In dissent, 4 ° Justice White argued that the reasoning behind
the Court's holding was flawed in light of judicial precedent and
the nature of the federal habeas statute. 14 1 Only in Stone, the dissent observed, had the Court ever held that a constitutional violation warranted relief on direct review, but not on collateral
136 Id. at 1723-25 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Greer v. Miller, Justice Stevens had
previously addressed the issue of what harmless-error standard applied to violations of
Doyle on habeas review. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 768 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens observed that, on direct review, the harmless-error standard
applicable to Doyle violations was whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. Generally, Justice Stevens opined that Chapman required too burdensome
a standard for states to meet on collateral review and should apply only to the most
outrageous instances of misconduct. See id. at 768-69 (Stevens, J., concurring).
137 Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1723 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); see also
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946) (quotation omitted) (looking to
the legislative history of the federal harmless-error statute, § 269 of the Judicial Code,
as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 391, for the proposition that if an "'error is of such a character that its natural effect is to prejudice a litigant's substantial rights, the burden of
sustaining a verdict will, notwithstanding this legislation rest upon the one who claims
under it' ").
138 Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1724 (Stevens,J., concurring).
139 Id. at 1724-25 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens contended that "[i]n the
end, the way we phrase the governing standard is far less important than the quality of
the judgment with which it is applied." Id. at 1725 (Stevens, J., concurring).
140 Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined by Justice Blackmun. Id.
Justice Souterjoined except as to the footnote and Part III of the dissent. Id. at 1725,
1732 (Souter, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 1725 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White began by asserting that the
practical effect of the majority's holding, the application of a less stringent harmlesserror standard on collateral review, would act to foreclose habeas petitioners from
relief and was problematic because it assumed that the direct appeal process functions without flaw. Id. The Justice stated: "As a result of [the Court's] decision ...the
fate of one in state custody turns on whether the state courts properly applied the
federal Constitution as then interpreted by decisions of this Court, and on whether we
choose to review his claim on certiorari." Id. Justice White then reasoned that
although there was no explicit authorization for using the Chapman standard on
habeas review, construction of both Chapman and the habeas statute supported such
an application. Id. at 1726 (White, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988);
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 584 (1986) (citation omitted)).
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review. 142 The reasoning in Stone, Justice White continued, was
wholly inapplicable regarding the use of Brecht's post-Mirandasilence because the nature of that violation was rooted in concerns
of due process and fundamental fairness and not the prophylactic
effects at issue in Stone.14 1 Accordingly, the dissent characterized
the majority's result as inexplicable, especially in light of the
Court's continued acceptance of the Chapman standard on direct
review. 144
Justice White next explained that the Court's holding, in tandem with the recent decision in Fulminante,foreclosed from habeas
review state court determinations that a constitutional error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 45 The Justice declared that
such a result was inconsistent with the purpose of habeas corpus as
a deterrent against violations of the Constitution by the state crimi4
nal justice systems. 1
Justice O'Connor authored a separate dissent. 1 47 First, the Justice acknowledged that the majority correctly noted the inherently
different natures of direct review and collateral review.1 48 The Jus142 Id. For an analysis of the majority opinion in Stone, see supra notes 65-67 and
accompanying text. Justice White also noted his dissent from the Court's result in
Stone. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1726 (White,J., dissenting) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 536-37 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)). See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying
text (discussing Justice Brennan's dissent in Stone, with which Justice White substantially agreed).
143 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1726-27 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice
White agreed with the majority's conclusion that the Doye rule was not a prophylactic
rule. Id. (citation omitted).
144 Id. at 1727 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Specifically, Justice White
stated: "Because the Court likewise leaves undisturbed the notion that Chapman's
harmless-error standard is required to protect constitutional rights .... its conclusion
that a Doyle violation that fails to meet that standard will not trigger federal habeas
relief is inexplicable." Id. (citation omitted).
145 Id. (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991) (footnote omitted)). See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing Fulminante). In
other words, the Justice stated: "[A] state court determination that a constitutional
error-even one as fundamental as the admission of a coerced confession . . . -is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt has in effect become unreviewable by lower federal courts by way of habeas corpus." Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1727 (White, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
146 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1727 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Desist v. United States,
394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("[T]he threat of habeas serves as
a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to
conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards.")). Modifications of the scope of the statute, the dissent asserted, were the
proper function of Congress, not the Supreme Court. Id. at 1727-28 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
147 Id. at 1728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148 Id. (citation omitted). Justice O'Connor's dissent in Withrow v. Williams, handed
down by the Court on the same day as Brecht, in which the Justice was joined by Chief
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tice also agreed with the majority's characterization of the violation
of Doyle as a constitutional trial error. 149 Justice O'Connor asserted, however, that the standard foundations for the Court's reductions in the scope of habeas review, notions of "federalism,
50
finality and fairness," did not justify the majority's conclusion.'
Justice O'Connor focused on the majority's failure to adequately address the nature of the Chapman standard and to explain
its reason for rejecting that standard in favor of the less strict standard of Kotteakos.' 5 ' The Justice argued that proper and diligent
application of the harmless-error rule was crucial to the guilt determination aspect of trials.' 5 2 The use of a lesser standard, Justice
O'Connor reasoned, would only undermine the reliability of convictions, as well as the confidence placed by the justice system and
the nation in that reliability. 153 While not dismissing the majority's
caveat that outrageous errors might trigger the stricter Chapman
standard, the Justice asserted that the exception nonetheless offered limited potential.15 1 In addition, Justice O'Connor cautioned that even providing an exception was only likely to
complicate further habeas jurisprudence.' 5 5
Justice Rehnquist, offered a rebuttal of the Court's decision not to extend the reasoning of Stone to violations of the Fifth Amendment right to silence under Miranda.
Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1756-65 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
149 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1729 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (citation omitted).
150 Id. (citation omitted). Justice O'Connor bemoaned the Court's failure to offer
any explanation of or investigation into the source of the Chapman standard. Id. The
Justice also observed that the purpose of habeas review, as a prisoner's right of action,
warranted the equitable construction of issues related to the guilt determination process. Id. (citation omitted).
151 See id. at 1729-31 (O'Connor,J., dissenting). TheJustice stated: "Proof of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt... sufficiently restores confidence in [a] verdict's
reliability that the conviction may stand despite the potentially accuracy impairing
error." Id. at 1730 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 1729 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor
posited that the new standard would allow errors to pass through the appellate process uncorrected. Id. at 1730 (O'Connor,J., dissenting). TheJustice further asserted
that the majority's assertion, that habeas relief was available only to remedy the most
egregious errors, ignored the practical fact that persons entitled to habeas relief "because of constitutional trial error have suffered a grievous wrong and ought not be
required to bear the greater risk of uncertainty the Court now imposes upon them."
Id.
153 Id. at 1730-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 1731 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
155 Id. Justice O'Connor observed that the majority's footnoted "exception would
be both exceedingly narrow and unrelated to reliability concerns." Id. (citing Brecht,
113 S. Ct. at 1722 n.9). Justice O'Connor pondered the possibility of allowing a broad
exception to the majority's holding for allegations of errors related to the guilt determination process. Id. at 1730-31 (O'Connor,J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor antici-
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Justice O'Connor asserted that the Court's decision to utilize a
less strict standard did not advance the cause of judicial efficiency.1 5 Noting Justice Stevens's concurrence, Justice O'Connor
observed that reviewing courts were still required to review the rec-7
15
ord extensively to ascertain the effect of an alleged violation.
The only factor affected by the new standard, the Justice stated,
would be the number of successful petitions.1 58 Justice O'Connor
concluded by criticizing the majority for relying on the justifiable
concerns of finality, federalism, and fairness, per se, without explaining the relationship between those concerns and the application and effect of the harmless-error rule. 5 9
The Supreme Court's decision in Brecht v. Abrahamson can be
fairly viewed as a substantial restriction on the availability of habeas
corpus relief. Coupled with the recent Fulminante decision, the
Rehnquist Court has taken another step in the "evisceration" of the
habeas statute that Justice Brennan had foreseen as a result of
Stone.1 60
The result reached by the Brecht Court, however, cannot be
criticized by asserting that it runs counter to precedent and plain
construction of the federal habeas statute. As the majority demonstrated, there does exist ample precedent to support the argument
that different standards apply to collateral review than are applicable to similar claims heard on direct review. 6 1 Additionally, Congress, regardless of its reasons, has left the habeas statute vague and
has not responded to the Court's varying interpretations over the
pated that pursuant to this exception, accuracy-related violations would be analyzed
under the stricter Chapman standard, while all other constitutional trial errors would
be analyzed under the Kotteakos standard. Id. The Justice rejected this approach because of its potential for opening new frontiers to litigation. Id. at 1731 (O'Connor,

J., dissenting).
156 Id.
157 Id. (citing Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1724 (Stevens, J., concurring)). See supra notes
136-39 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens's concurrence).
158 Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1731 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated
that the new standard would "simply reduce [ ] the number of cases in which relief will
be granted. It does not decrease the burden of identifying those cases that warrant
relief." Id.
159 Id. at 1731-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In conclusion, Justice O'Connor declared: " [ T] he Court's decision cuts too broadly and deeply to comport with the equitable and remedial nature of the habeas writ; it is neitherjustified nor justifiable from
the standpoint of fairness or judicial efficiency." Id. at 1732 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
160 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 516 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (commenting on the disparate treatment given to cases on direct and collateral review).
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years. 16 2 Nonetheless, Justice White's arguments that the Court ignores precedent and the nature of the habeas statute are not without merit.1 6 1 In Brecht, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the many
cases which have acknowledged the difference between direct and
collateral review. 6 4 But as Justice White noted, only in Stone did
the Court find that a right cognizable on direct review was not reviewable on collateral review. 65 Additionally, the Supreme Court
in Stone emphasized that its focus was not on habeas corpus, but on
the significant costs of the exclusionary rule.166 Given the wide
reach of the harmless-error rule, state courts now have the effective
power to exclude constitutional rights from the scope of habeas
corpus.167
The habeas statute itself, 18 U.S.C. § 2254(a), provides that
petitions for relief shall be entertained where the petitioner has
alleged that his or her imprisonment was "in violation of the Constitution."16 8 Section 2243 directs reviewing courts to "dispose of
the matter as law and justice require."169 The statute is thus based
on the principle of fairness to those unjustly convicted. The operation of the statute is obviously subject to principles of criminal procedure, but it simply cannot be implied from the statute that
persons imprisoned in violation of the Constitution are to be denied relief if the violation is shown not to have had a substantial
effect on the jury's result.
Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Brecht, implied that the Court
was not seeking to "eviscerate" the habeas corpus doctrine. 70 The
world is far from perfect, yet the majority apparently believes that
the direct review process will always come up with the correct result. The majority also ignores the fact that the Supreme Court, as
the last stop on direct review, cannot begin to effectively entertain
See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 28.2(d), at 1183; Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718.
Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1725 (White, J., dissenting). See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text (discussing Justice White's dissenting opinion).
164 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719 (citations omitted).
165 Id. at 1726 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536-37
(1976)). See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (discussing Justice White's
comparison of the issues in Brecht and Stone).
166 Stone, 428 U.S. at 481-82 n.17.
167 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1727 (White, J., dissenting). See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text (analyzing Justice White's dissent).
168 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
169 Id. § 2243 (1988).
170 SeeBrecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1732 (O'Connor,J., dissenting) ("Unless we are to accept
the proposition that denying relief whenever possible is an unalloyed good, the costs
[of habeas cited by the Court] cannot by themselves justify the lowering of standards
announced [by the Court].").
162
163
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even a small portion of the constitutional claims raised by defendants on direct review. Defendants with valid federal claims are
forced to seek collateral relief precisely because the state courts
have failed them.
The Court's emphasis on the hostility generated in the state
courts because of habeas review is unwarranted. 71 As noted, of the
9000 to 10,000 habeas petitions filed each year, fewer than four
percent result in any relief being granted.172 Lightning strikes, but
not very often.173 Based on the numbers, it would seem as if the
system is working correctly, granting relief only to outrageous failures in the crowded, overburdened state justice systems.
Justice O'Connor's dissent lends credence to the argument
that the Court's motivation lies in hostility to defendants' rights in
general. 1 74 As the Justice noted, the Court's decision does little to
streamline the post-conviction relief process.' 75 The Court simply
exchanged a less strict standard for a stricter one. Courts will still
be required to review the records of an imposing number of
habeas petitioners. 7 6 The decision
in Brecht only allows for fewer
77
granted.'
be
to
petitions
those
of
Finally, the Court has consistently praised the virtues of finality
178
as a significant reason for curtailing the scope of habeas corpus.
The Court's praise of finality, however, denigrates the value of the
Constitution's guarantees.1 79 The Court has determined that there
is great worth in establishing a clear line that marks the end of
171 See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1720.
172 LAFAVE

& ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 28.2, at 1187.

173 SeeWithrowv. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1765 (1993) (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).

In Withrow, Justice O'Connor explained that habeas relief, "'strik[ing] like lightning'
years after conviction," afforded little deterrent effect to potential violators of the
Constitution. Id. (quotation omitted).
174 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Is the Rehnquist CourtReally That Conservative?: An Analysis of the 1991-92 Term, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 987, 994 (1993) ("Perhaps the most
consistent theme of the Rehnquist Court has been the narrowing of the rights of
criminal defendants.").
175 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra notes 156-59 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion that the Court's holding
will not advance judicial efficiency).
176 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1724 (StevensJ., concurring).
177 Id. at 1731 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
178 Id. at 1720. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
value of finality).
179 In response to Coleman v. Thompson, and Roger Coleman's subsequent execution,Judge Lay stated: "It is difficult ... to believe that in today's society an individual
may be executed by reason of a technical error by his or her lawyer in order to exalt
the goal of state finality above the requirements of fundamental fairness." Lay, supra
note 65, at 1063.
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legal proceedings. The favoring of procedure over those guarantees devalues the Constitution as well as the entire justice system.
The Supreme Court, in its efforts to ease the strain on the
judiciary caused by habeas corpus petitions, dismissed the needs of
imprisoned persons who have been convicted in violation of the
Constitution. Habeas corpus remains an extraordinary remedy for
those who have been egregiously wronged by the legal system.18 0
The Court's decision in Brecht does little to ease the burden on the
judiciary and senselessly harms persons who have been wrongly
convicted. The Court's decision in Withrow, declining to extend the
reasoning of Stone to violations of Miranda,181 demonstrates that
the Court is not blind to the virtues of habeas corpus. Nonetheless,
the Court's decision to distinguish direct and collateral review by
establishing an easily satisfied harmless-error standard is a significant step in the evisceration of habeas corpus that Justice Brennan
so feared.
James A. Carey, Jr.

180 One commentator suggested that the appropriate response to the controversy
of habeas corpus is to change the nature of habeas corpus review from a collateral
proceeding to part of the direct appellate review process. Barry Friedman, A Tale of
Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REv. 247, 324, 331 (1988). Professor Friedman contended
that the Supreme Court cannot provide meaningful direct review of the vast amount
of claims challenging state courts' handling of federal claims. Id. at 331. Accordingly,
the professor asserted, habeas review should be available to all claims of federal constitutional error as an automatic appeal in the federal courts. Id.
181 Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1750-55 (1993).

